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ABSTRACT
This document summarizes the results of a study addressing the nuclear safety integration
and operational aspects of transporting nuclear payloads to and from an earth orbiting Space
Base by the Space Shuttle. The study was performed as a part of the overall Space Base
Nuclear System Safety Study summarized in Volume I, Part 1, 72SD4201-1-1.
The representative payloads considered were (1) the Zirconium Hydride reactor-Brayton
power module, (2) the isotope-Brayton power module, and (3) small Isotope power systems
or heat sources. Areas of Investigation include nuclear safety related integration/packaging
and operational/procedural requirements of the Shuttle and Payload systems for all phases
of the mission (launch through recovery). A preliminary terrestrial safety evaluation was
also performed. Results of the analyses indicate (1) the need for a transfer module to mini-
mize the Integration impact on all systems, (2) no additional shielding is required for the
crew in transport of a clean reactor, (3) the blast and fragmentation environment of the
Shuttle is severe - the positioning of the payload away from the Mobile Launcher tower will
reduce fragmentation damage, and (4) use of the Shuttle for retrieval and recovery of nuclear
payloads can result in a low risk to the general populace.
The nuclear safety guidelines resulting from the study should be considered in subsequent
phases of NASA's Space Shuttle program to increase overall system safety.
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FOREWORD
Operational and design requirements of large, long
duration manned space vehicles differ from those of the
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular
interest are the radiation survivability and nuclear
safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors
and isotopes and the long term interaction with the
natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-
MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed a study entitled
"Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express
purposes of addressing the nuclear considerations in-
volved in manned earth orbital missions (operational
and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety
aspects). An added task addressed the nuclear safety
aspects of transporting nuclear hardware to and from
the Space Base by the Space Shuttle.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of
Manned Space Flight, Office of Advanced Research and
Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data
Institute. It was performed for NASA's George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of
Mr. Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analy-
sis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA and AEC
advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of
NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes.
The titles and a cross-reference matrix of the subjects
covered in the various volumes is presented in the Table,
on the next page.
Questions regarding these volumes may be forwarded to
the following:
Walter H. Stafford,
COR/Technical Manager
Space Base Nuclear System Safely Study
Code PD-SA-0
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama 35812
Telephone (205) 453-0470
Ellsworth E. Gerrels,
Study Program Manager
General Electric Company
Space Division
P. O. Box 8661
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
Telephone (215) 462-7261
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INTRODUCTION
GENERAL
The Space Shuttle with boost, maneuvering, payload
handling, retrieval and reentry capability is potentially
a versatile and reliable transporter of nuclear hardware.
This study has investigated the nuclear safety integra-
tion and operational aspects of transporting nuclear
payloads to and from an earth orbiting Space Base by
the Space Shuttle. The study was performed as an ad-
ditional task to the Space Base Nuclear System Safety
Study which was summarized in Volume I, Part 1
(72SD42 01-1-1).
The representative payloads considered were (1) the
Zirconium Hydride (ZrH) reactor-Brayton power module,
(2) the isotope-Brayton power module, and 3) small
isotope power systems or heat sources.
Results of this study are considered applicable for de-
sign and development phases of future nuclear missions
involving the Space Shuttle. Study details can be found
in Volumes IV, Part 1 and 2 and Volume V, Part 2.
OBJECTIVES
The prime objective of this study is to provide a nuclear
system safety investigation of the Space Shuttle as a
means of transportation of nuclear systems used in con-
junction with a Manned Space Base. The specific study
objectives are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Specific Study Objectives
• Determine the safety related impact of nuclear payloads
on the design and operation of the Shuttle.
• Identify safety related constraints imposed by the Shuttle
upon the design and integration of nuclear payloads.
• Assess nuclear hazards to the earth's populace that
result from transportation of nuclear payloads.
• Establish nuclear safety and integration guidelines and
procedural recommendations for use in the trans-
portation of nuclear payloads with the Shuttle.
SCOPE
This study addresses the nuclear system safety aspects
of the Space Shuttle/Space Base program including crew/
personnel safety, mission success, and the impact on
supporting facilities.
Mission operations considered include:
• Preparation and transportation at Launch Site
• Launch and ascent to the Space Base
• Rendezvous and docking at the Space Base
• In-orbit transfer (loading-unloading)
• End of Mission return to earth including reentry and
landing
• End of Mission disposal into high orbit
• Emergency disposal
• Abort/contingency modes
The nuclear related hazards associated with the nuclear
payloads are identified. Design and operational features
of the Shuttle and nuclear payloads are evaluated to
provide nuclear safety related payload integration con-
siderations.
A preliminary terrestrial nuclear safety analysis is
performed for the reactor and isotope-Brayton power
module payloads. Means for implementing contingency
operations and normal and emergency in-flight mainte-
nance and repair are discussed. Design and operations
guidelines are presented for use in subsequent phases
of Space Shuttle/nuclear payload programs in the elim-
ination reduction of nuclear hazards to the crew, sup-
port personnel and the earth's populace.
The basic ground rules employed in the study are sum-
marized in Table 2.
Table 2 . Study Ground Rules
The reference mission is the Space Base mission supported by the
Space Shuttle as defined by McDonnell Douglas and North American
Rockwell for NASA MSFC, and MSC respectively.
The Space Shuttle will be used as the transporter in the initial launch
and subsequent replacement and disposal/recovery of the nuclear
sources.
The nuclear payloads to be considered will consist of complete or
modularized isotope-Brayton and ZrH reactor-Brayton power modules
in addition to small Isotope sources. The payload configurations
and operational capability are those studied by NAR and MDAC for
NASA.
The Space Shuttle baseline is assumed to be capable of handling a
payload of at least 11.3 t (25 klb) to a 500 km (270 nm), 55° inclined
orbit with payload dimensions of up to 4.6 m (15 ft) diameter and
18.3 m (60 ft) in length.
Dose rate to the Shuttle crew should be minimized. Maximum dose
rate to the crew from nuclear payloads is to be limited to 150 mrem/
day (5 cm depth dose).
STUDY APPROACH
The Space Base safety analyses consisted of seven
principal tasks as illustrated in Figure 1. The
BASELINE
DEFINITION
TASK 4.0
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SAFETY
• HAZARD ANALYSIS
• DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
f OPER. CONSIDERATIONS
TASK 5.0
REACTOR NUCLEAR SAFETY
• TERRESTRIAL SAFETY
ANALYSIS
• TRADE STUDIES
• OPER. ANALYSIS
MISSION OPERATIONS NUCLEAR]
SAFETY
• GROUND SUPPORT
• FACILITIES
• RECOVERY
INPUTS
TASK 1,2.3
«. s.e
Figure 1. Study Task Structure
Shuttle nuclear safety effort (Task 8) was added during
, the course of the Space Base Study. Task 8 was divid-
ed into the following subtasks:
8.1 Nuclear Payload/Space Shuttle Integration
8.2 Terrestrial Nuclear Safety Analysis
8.3 Nuclear Safety Guidelines and Requirement
Preparation
Subtask 8.1 involved the evaluation of designated Shuttle
and payload concepts to identify the significant inter-
face requirements to implement nuclear safety (crew,
ground support personnel, equipment) during all mis-
sion phases. A preliminary nuclear safety evaluation
of the nuclear payloads was performed in Subtask 8.2
with emphasis on terrestrial nuclear safety to deter-
mine the hazards and degree of risk to the general popu-
lace and ecology. Detailed failure sequence trees were
developed to identify the source, probability and extent
of the hazards. A contingency evaluation was perform-
ed to identify the major contingency situations and pos-
sible actions which could be taken.
The various analyses resulted in the formulation of a
number of nuclear safety related guidelines. These
were compiled and documented in Subtask 8.3.
REFERENCE MISSION
A reference mission was established to allow identifi-
cation and analysis of operations and potential hazards
and to provide a reference design against which guide-
lines and recommendations resulting from the study
could be established and evaluated. The reference mis-
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sion incorporated significant nuclear safety aspects from
the Space Base and Space Shuttle studies of North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas.
SPACE SHUTTLE
The Shuttle can be used to transport nuclear systems
from the launch pad to a Space Base in low earth orbit
(typically 500 km, 55 inclination), and dispose of the
nuclear systems at their end of life by return to the
earth's surface or injection into high earth orbit. Typi-
cal staging points of a Shuttle mission are shown in
Figure 2.
TERMINAL RENDEZVOUS
500 km (270 nm) ORB IT
55° INCLINATION
CIRCULAR IZATION
185 km (100 nm) ORB IT
55° INCLINATION
INSERTION
93x185 km
(50 x 100 nm) ORB IT
STAGING
MAXq
LANDING
HIGH EARTH
f ORBIT DISPOSAL
RETURN PHASING
DEORBIT
ENTRY
The Space Shuttle launch configuration consists of two
separate vehicles, (1) a booster which provides the
initial lift-off thrust, and (2) the Shuttle orbiter which
carries the payload into earth orbit after separating
from the booster subsequent to first stage thrust termi-
nation. Since the nuclear payload is carried inside the
Shuttle, the Shuttle configuration rather than the booster
was of most importance in this study. The NAR and
MDAC Phase B Shuttle configurations are shown in
Figures 3 and 4.
NAR
MANIPULATOR ARMS
(LEFT AND RIGHT)
MANIPULATOR OPERATOR'S
STATION
PASSIVE DOCKING RING
2 + 2 CREW
COMPARTMENT
Figure 2. Shuttle Mission Staging Points Figure 3. NAR Phase B Shuttle Configuration
MDAC
PAY LOAD A DARTER.
FLEX TUNNEL
CREW COMPARTMENT
Figure 4. MDAC Phase B Shuttle Configuration
In both configurations, the cargo bay is in close proxi-
mity to the primary LH /LO tankage. The NAR Shuttle
£t Z
has two crew locations - the manipulator operator's
station and the pilot's cockpit, respectively. The MDAC
Shuttle has only one crew location, the pilot's cockpit,
located 6.1m forward of the cargo bay.
NUCLEAR PAYLOADS
The reactor power module identified for the Space Base
Study is 6.6 m in diameter and does not fit within the
4 .6m diameter Shuttle cargo bay. Therefore, the
Space Station ZrH reactor power module with a Brayton
cycle power conversion system was used in this study
because of its compatibility with the Space Shuttle cargo
bay dimensional limitations. The basic reactor is the
same as that identified for the Space Base Program
with the following exceptions:
1. Normal operation is at 125 kWt compared to
the 330 kWt of the Space Base Program, re-
sulting in decreased radiator area. (Trans-
port of the Space Base power module by Space
Shuttle might involve a deployable radiator or
multiple Shuttle launches.)
2. The reactor/shield assembly incorporates less
radiation shielding resulting in a lower mass
but increased dose rates around its perimeter.
The reference reactor power system can be packaged
in various configurations to maintain Shuttle compati-
bility. A single reactor module is illustrated in
Figure 5.
The isotope-Bray ton power system could consist of one
or more large isotope heat sources coupled with several
power conversion systems to provide the desired total
electrical power output. For purposes of this study,
two 52 kWt heat sources are operated simultaneously
to provide 25 kWe usable power. Three configurations
for the 25 kWe isotope-Brayton power system were con-
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180 CM
NEUTRON SHIELD
(LiH)
GAM/VIA SHIELD
(Ta-lOW)
NEUTRON SHIELD
(LiH)
GAMMA SHIELD
<U-8Mo)
Figure 5. Shuttle Compatible Single Reactor Module
sidered. The common nuclear component to be found
in each of the configurations is the Isotope Reentry
Vehicle (IRV). The IRV, shown in Figure 6, with the
Power Boom configuration, consists of a planar array of
plutonium-238 fuel capsules (heat source) contained with-
in a reentry body. The Shuttle could transport one or
more IRV's or a total power system,provided integra-
ion requirements are met.
Two small isotope sources were considered,representa-
tive of the type that might be transported by the Shuttle
in future space operations; the Multi-Hundred Watt
(MHW) Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG)
and the Radioisotope for Thermal Energy (RITE) fuel
capsule. The MHW-RTG is .designed to deliver 150 w of
electrical power from a heat source loading of 2400 w
thermal of Pu-238. The MHW could be used singly or
in multiples to power unmanned vehicles on deep space
missions. The RITE fuel capsule is intended to provide
heat for an Environmental Control/Life Support (EC/LS)
waste processing system to be used on large manned
spacecraft. The capsule used in this unit contains
420 w thermal of Pu-238 and operates at a temperature
of 1033°K (1400°F).
DIAMETER -
MASS -
FUEL
INVENTORY -
2.36 M (92 IN )
1800 KG (3.90 KLBS)
238 PU O2
52 KWT (BOL)
Figure 6. Typical Isotope Brayton Module with IRV's
MAJOft STUDY CONCLUSIONS
• SAFETY AND HANDLING CAN BE IMPROVED AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IM-
POSED ON THE SHUTTLE REDUCED IF A TRANSFER MODULE IS USED TO SUPPORT
THE NUCLEAR PAYLOAD WITHIN THE SHUTTLE CARGO BAY.
• NUCLEAR PAYLOADS REQUIRE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITHIN THE CARGO
BAY. A PROTECTIVE LINER COUPLED WITH INERT GAS CONTAINMENT/PURGING
IS RECOMMENDED FOR REACTOR POWER MODULE.
• NO ADDITIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION FOR THE SHUTTLE CREW IS REQUIRED
DURING TRANSPORTATION OF REACTOR AND ISOTOPE PAYLOADS UNDER NORMAL
CONDITIONS.
• THE SHUTTLE BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION ENVIRONMENT IS RELATIVELY
SEVERE DUE TO THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF THE PAYLOAD TO THE PROPELLANT
TANKAGE. CONSIDERABLE BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION IS RE-
QUIRED FOR ISOTOPE PAYLOADS IN THE LAUNCH CONFIGURATION.
• SPACE SHUTTLE/LAUNCH COMPLEX CONFIGURATIONS WHICH POSITION THE
NUCLEAR PAYLOAD BETWEEN THE SHUTTLE PROPELLANT TANKS AND THE
MOBILE LAUNCHER TOWER PRESENT AN UNDESIRABLE FRAGMENTATION EN-
VIRONMENT AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED.
• THERMAL CONTROL IS REQURED OF LARGE ISOTOPE SYSTEMS DURING ALL
PHASES OF THE SHUTTLE/PAYLOAD MISSION. SMALL ISOTOPES MAY HAVE LESS
STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS DEPENDING ON PACKAGING CONFIGURATION.
• THE RISK TO THE GENERAL POPULACE IS LOW IN TRANSPORTING EITHER A
REACTOR OR ISOTOPE SYSTEM BY THE SHUTTLE. USE OF THE SHUTTLE FOR
RECOVERY OF A REACTOR AS CONTRASTED TO A BOOST TO HIGH EARTH ORBIT,
CAN REDUCE THE OVERALL RISK BY AT LEAST AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE.
• THE SHUTTLE PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE CONTINGENCY FLEXIBILITY (i. e.,
REBOOST TO HIGH EARTH ORBIT, PAYLOAD EJECTION IN DEEP OCEAN AREA,
REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT OF FAILED DISPOSAL SYSTEM).
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The Shuttle Nuclear System Safety Analysis, a part
of the Space Base Nuclear System Safety study is in-
tended to provide data for the timely and systematic
incorporation of radiological system safety into all
applicable phases of NASA's space program with
particular emphasis on the Space Shuttle. The key
candidate areas for programmatic applications are
discussed below.
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAMS
The study provides a preliminary assessment of the
Shuttle integration and operational considerations in
support of nuclear payloads. Crew radiation protec-
tion requirements are identified. A terrestrial safety
analysis of ZrH reactor and isotope-Brayton power
module/Shuttle missions was performed to identify
the highest risk areas in the mission. Nuclear Safety
related design and operational guidelines are presented
for application to NASA's Shuttle program.
MANNED EARTH ORBITAL SPACECRAFT PROGRAMS
Shuttle/nuclear payload docking techniques are pre-
sented which consider replacement and retrieval of
RELATIONSHIP TO FUTURE NASA PROGRAM
spent modules as well as initial installation to an earth
orbiting base. Emphasis is on minimizing crew doses,
visual capability and maintenance of positive control of
the pay load at all times.
NASA/AEC REACTOR AND ISOTOPE PROGRAMS
Results of the integration and operational evaluation and
terrestrial nuclear safety analysis of Shuttle/nuclear
payload missions can be applied in future space reactor
and isotope programs involving the Space Shuttle. De-
sign and operational features which can eliminate or
reduce hazards and risks to hardware and personnel
are identified.
INTERPLANETARY SPACE PROGRAMS
Many of the guidelines established and design features
identified for the Shuttle transport of nuclear payloads
are applicable to Shuttle launched interplanetary pro-
grams employing isotope or reactor power systems and
nuclear propulsion stages.
PROGRAM PLANNING
The study assists in identifying safety related program
requirements for planning and support of future Shuttle
missions employing nuclear hardware. Of particular
interest is the impact on support facilities and operations
at KSC and the requirements of the recovery and radio-
logical control teams at the nuclear hardware impact
points and Shuttle landing sites.
SPACE NUCLEAR SYSTEM DESIGN AND SAFETY STUDIES
An extensive review of space and nuclear system design
and safety literature was performed. Documents were
categorized as to technical content and source, and com-
pleted ASKDI forms were submitted to NASA's Aerospace
Safety Research and Data Institute in Cleveland, Ohio.
This data along with data in Volume VII Part 1 of this
study, provides an excellent source index of nuclear sys-
tem safety related literature.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY IN TRANSPORT OF REACTOR POWER MODULES
PACKAGING AND INTEGRATION
Various integration considerations play an important
role in implementing the nuclear safety of the Shuttle
mission. The Shuttle cargo bay dimensions, payload
mass limits, and the center of gravity envelope are the
prime Shuttle-imposed constraints on a reactor power
module. These constraints limit the total radiator area
available, the shield and reactor mass; and therefore
have a direct impact on reactor power system growth
capability.
Figure 7 illustrates the principal safety related inte-
gration requirements. A summary of these require-
ments is presented in the following paragraphs.
• Radiation Protection. No additional radiation
protection is required for the crew with a pre-
operational reactor placed in the cargo bay. A
similar conclusion can be made for the post-
operational case provided the reactor is placed
toward the rear of the Shuttle cargo bay not prior
to ten days after reactor shutdown. Adverse
radiation effects on Shuttle subsystems are not
expected, however, integrated doses over many
nuclear missions would merit further considera-
tion (material selection and location of solid
state electronics, film, etc.).
• REACTOR MODULE
t MUST FIT IN CARGO BAY
• MODULE CG MUST BE WITHIN
SHUTTLE CG ENVELOPE
• ENVIRONMENTAL ENCLOSURE
« PROVIDE INERT GAS
.ENVIRONMENT
• THERMAL CONTROL
RADIATION SHIELDING
t 150MREM/DAY
-• BLAST/FRAGMENTATION
PROTECTION
• DECAY HEAT REMOVAL
• 1ECTRICAL POWER
• DISPLAY PANELS FOR MONITORING & CONTROL
* CONTINUOUS MONITORING REQUIRED
- RADIATION
- NaK LEAKS
TRANSFER MODULE
• MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH
SHUTTLE PAYLOAD ATTACH
FITTINGS
• ALLOWS MINIMUM IMPACT
ON SHUTTLE
Figure 7. Reactor Packaging/Shuttle Integration
Blast and Fragmentation Protection. The
Shuttle presents a severe blast and fragmenta-
tion environment (Figure 8). Little or no
additional blast and fragmentation protection is
required of an unoperated reactor, however, the
positioning of the payload away from the Mobile
Launcher tower to provide an unobstructed ejec-
tion path will reduce fragmentation damage.
Design for intact impact of the core in the post-
operational case could be required due to the
potential high fission product inventory.
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Ml
TOWER
UNDESIRABLE PAY LOAD STACKING
100.000
10.000
1000
100
SMOTU
ORB I HI)
NOTE: ENGLISH UNITS
YIELD.
Figure 8. Shuttle Explosive Overpressure
and Blast Environment
• Environmental Protection. The cargo bay should
be capable of preventing LO2 and LH2 vapors
from entering. Double containment or an inert
cover gas "blanket" around the power module
(particularly around its liquid metal components)
•will reduce liquid metal hazards.
• Thermal Control. Temperature transients with-
in the cargo bay could cause NaK freeze up.
Auxiliary heating may be required to resolve
this problem. If it were found necessary to
place a reactor power module into the cargo bay
immediately after reactor shutdown, up to 1 kWt
cooling could be required to remove decay heat.
A transfer of this nature should be avoided and
a waiting period of at least 2 days planned to allow
for thermal cool down.
• Payload System Status and Controls. It is esti-
mated that the receipt of 80 data points and dis-
plays (periodic and continuous monitoring), and
sending of 25 control signals are required of
Shuttle systems.
• Electrical Power. A maximum of 1 kw electri-
cal power is required for 2 days, if decay heat
thermal control is necessary. Other electrical
requirements 'should not exceed 0.5 kw total.
Either power from batteries or the Shuttle Elec-
trical Power System could be considered.
• Attachments and Payload Handling. The power/
module center of gravity may be located toward
the reactor/shield and away from the primary
attach points. Additional support may be required
to prevent longitudinal buckling. The use of a
cradle type "transfer module" (see Figure 7),
which supports the reactor and in turn is placed
in the cargo bay can significantly reduce Shuttle
integration requirements and increase safety
during handling operations. A capability of emer-
gency payload ejection into a deep ocean area
(during launch or end-of-life recovery operations)
could be provided by the "transfer module".
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TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS
A ZrH reactor power module presents a relatively low
nuclear hazard prior to orbital operations if pre-flight
criticality tests are limited to low power levels. After
operations in orbit, the reactor could have a potenti-
ally large core fission product inventory, thus increas-
ing the nuclear hazards during retrieval, disposal or
recovery operations which would be performed by the
Shuttle.
Several power module ground handling and orbital trans-
fer techniques were defined. Figure 9 illustrates
potential transfer techniques during prelaunch. The
liquid metal hazards may be the dominant consideration.
Installation at the launch pad is preferred in that this
operation can occur late in the countdown. This ap-
proach would reduce the possibility of prelaunch acci-
dents that could involve the reactor and eliminates the
possibility of potential nuclear related accidents in the
VAB and the necessity of providing the nuclear support,
plans and hardware for that facility.
A configuration which permits location of the reactor
in the Shuttle cargo bay away from the Mobile Launcher
INTEGRATION IN VAB
• REACTOR HORIZONTALLY INSTALLED
IN ORBITER CARGO BAY
« ORB ITER VERTICALLY MATED TO
BOOSTER
• SHUTTLE TRANSPORTED TO LAUNCH
PAD ON MOBILE LAUNCHER (ML)
• ORBITER VERTICALLY MATED TO
BOOSTER
« REACTOR VERTICALLY INSTALLED
IN ORB ITER CARGO BAY
* SHUTTLE TRANSPORTED TO LAUNCH
PAD ON ML
INTEGRATION AT LAUNCH PAD
• SHUTTLE HORIZONTALLY TOWED TO
LAUNCH PAD
t REACTOR HORIZONTALLY INSTALLED
IN ORB ITER CARGO BAY
t SHUTTLE ERECTED FOR LAUNCH
• SHUTTLE TRANSPORTED TO LAUNCH
PAD ON ML
• REACTOR VERTICALLY INSTALLED
IN ORB ITER CARGO BAY
Figure 9. Reactor Integration with Shuttle
tower is preferred to reduce fragmentation damage
potential.
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Power module replacement and retrieval missions take
on added complexity since two reactor power modules
must be handled - the replacement power module that
is brought up in the Shuttle and the "spent" module that
is to be replaced.
Several orbital replacement and retrieval/recovery
techniques are shown in Figure 10 which employ three
different pay load transfer devices: (1) manipulator
arms (articulation), (2) flexible tunnel (rotation, and
(3) scissors platform (translation).
The radiation dose to the Shuttle crew from a shutdown
"spent" power module after 5 years operation at 125
kWt requires that a minimum wait time of at least 10
days be allotted for the dose rate to go below the maxi-
mum allowable 150 mrem/day. Crew gamma shielding
would be required if the wait time were reduced. The
flexible tunnel approach would be unacceptable for the
transport of a spent module unless a rotational trun-
nion were used to position the shield in the aft section
of the cargo bay.
Additional analysis is required to determine the best
approach when nuclear safety parameters such as crew
14
DOCK THROUGH REACTOR MODULE
SELF PROPELLED REACTOR MODULE
DIRECT SHUTTLE HARD DOCK
SPACE TU TRANSFER
Figure 10. Replacement/Retreival Schemes
dose rates, visibility and positive control are consider-
ed. There is no need for recovery of the radiator and
power conversion systems. In fact, a liquid metal
radiator adds to the non-nuclear hazards during recov- ;
ery. Techniques should be developed to recover only
the reactor/shield.
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
The implementation of contingency operations could
eliminate or substantially reduce the adverse effects
on the mission and the risks to personnel resulting
from accident or failure situations. The contingencies
addressed in the study include:
• Liquid metal leak detected within cargo bay on
launch pad
• Detected failure of power module during launch
ascent or rendezvous
• Shuttle failure during ascent
• Failure of Shuttle doors to open prior to payload
emergency ejection
• Failure to remove power module from cargo
bay or to dock to Space Base
• Shuttle retrieval, disposal or recovery of a
'. damaged power module
• Disposal failure resulting in short life orbit
detected during descent from orbit
The following provisions are considered key to the im-
plementation of contingency plans:
• Double containment - use of a positive pressure
liner
• Back-up Shuttle support and rescue
• Liquid metal fire protection equipment within
Shuttle
• A strap-on disposal system
• Fault detection of Shuttle and power module
failures during flight
• Ejection of payload into deep ocean areas
• Clean, obstruction free cargo bay interior
surfaces
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NUCLEAR SAFETY IN TRANSPORT OF LARGE ISOTOPE POWER SYSTEMS
PACKAGING AND INTEGRATION
Packaging and integration for the transport of an isotope-
Brayton power module presents several different safety
considerations than does a reactor. No liquid metal
hazard exists with an isotope-Brayton power module as
contrasted with a reactor power module. Coolant loops
generally contain relatively non-hazardous organic
fluids. Important differences occur in the Prelaunch
Phase where an isotope heat source presents continuous
thermal and radiation hazards. The isotope heat source
must be cooled at all times prior to lift-off. In addition,
it is a constant source of neutron radiation with in-
creased gamma radiation occurring as the isotope
decays, reaching a peak after 18 years.
The principal, safety related Shuttle integration consi-
derations for transport of the isotope heat source are
illustrated in Figure 11, and are summarized below:
Radiation Protection. No auxiliary shielding
is required for the Shuttle orbiter crew for
normal operations provided the base of the
conical heat source is parallel to the cargo
bay and at least 5.5 m from the nearest crew
member.
ISOTOPE REENTRY VEHICLE
- MUST FIT IN CARGO BAY
- CG MUST BE WITHIN SHUTTLE
CG ENVELOPE
THERMAL CONTROL
- COOL IN AIR TO«20°K
- PASSIVE OR ACTIVE CONTROL
IN SPACE AND ON REENTRY
AND LANDING
RADIATION SHIELDING
- < 150MREM, DAY
BLAST/FRAGMENTATION
PROTECTION
PAYLOAD STATUS AND CONTI
- DISPLAYS
- CONTINUOUS AND PERIODIC MONITORING
- CONTROL SIGNALS
RANSFER MODULE
. COMPATIBLE WITH SHUTTLE
ATTACH POINTS
. IRV EJECTION CAPABILITY
Figure 11. Isotope Reentry Vehicle Packaging/
Shuttle Integration
• Blast and Fragmentation Protection. Blast
and fragmentation protection must be provided
while in the Shuttle. The most severe problem
exists at launch due to the large amount of
propellant. The payload must be provided an
unobstructed ejection path, preferably into an
ocean or remote area, should a launch explo-
sion occur.
• Thermal Control. Thermal control of an iso-
tope heat source is required within the Shuttle
to maintain acceptable capsule temperatures.
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Where an entirely passive system is not fea-
sible, redundant and/or back-up systems as
shown in Figure 12, must be provided. The
design of the blast and fragmentation shield is
intimately .involved in thermal control design.
• PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL
HEMISPHERICAL AUGMENTED
SHIELD HEMISPHERICAL
SHIELD
• ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL
SHIELD
SHUTTLE-
Figure 12. Thermal Control Concepts
Pay load System Status and Controls. It is
estimated that the receipt of a maximum of
62 data points and display functions (periodic
and continuous monitoring), and sending of
32 control signals are required of Shuttle
systems.
Electrical Power, tt is estimated that a maxi-
mum of 300 w of electrical power is required,
and the total energy requirement will not ex-
ceed 23 kw-hr for sapport of the thermal con-
trol system. This power could be supplied by
batteries.
Attachment and Payload Handling. The use of a
supporting cradle "transfer module" will greatly
reduce Shuttle interface requirements and pro-
vide possible ejection capability over the conti-
nental shelf or deep ocean areas if diagnostic data
during ascent and landing warrant it.
TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS
The transport operations involving the Isotope Reentry
Vehicle (IRV) are similar to those of a reactor power
module with notable exceptions described in the following
paragraphs.
The initial interaction between the IRV and the Space
Shuttle occurs when it is installed in the Shuttle cargo bay.
Due to the radiation and thermal environment charac-
teristics of the heat source, integration with the Shuttle
at the launch pad should occur as late in the countdown
as possible.
It is assumed that the IRV would be placed in an IRV
Transfer Module prior to installation in the Shuttle cargo
bay. The transfer module will serve to protect the IRV,
simplify handling and provide a mode of thermal control.
The isotope-Brayton Power Conversion System (PCS)
can also be installed in a transfer module. Depending
18
on the logistics requirements and design configuration,
:
the PCS can be transported with the IRV or by a sepa-
rate Shuttle launch. Launch of multiple units of either
the IRV or PCS are possible.
During a normal launch ascent, the heat generated by
the isotope fuel is largely taken up by the heat source
structure. Only a slight increase in temperature is
expected in the approximate 8 minutes of flight, prior to
opening of the cargo bay doors. The expected tempera-
ture profile of the heat source is shown in Figure 13
along with the anticipated increase in temperature if the
. doors fail to open.
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Several approaches to delivery, transfer, retrieval and
recovery were defined, the majority of the techniques
closely paralleling those described for the reactor power
module. Recovery of ah IRV is assumed to be a prime
objective.
Three transfer schemes associated with the delivery of
an IRV to the Space Base are detailed in Figure 1*4.
All three involve the use of manipulators and in each case
operations are performed without EVA. Special features
should include: (1) the limiting of travel so that an
IRV cannot be placed adjacent to Shuttle or Space Base
surfaces, (2) side-on positioning with respect to the crew,
(3) visual contact during operations, and (4) all power
system assemblies secured at all times.
GENERAL PURPOSE
MANIPULATOR
Figure 13. Estimated Heat Source Temperature Profile Figure 14. IRV Transfer Schemes
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Retrieval and recovery operations are similar to ascent
and rendezvous. However, during descent, Shuttle
doors would remain closed and active cooling of the IRV
would be required.
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
The contingency modes available in a Shuttle mission
transporting an isotope heat source(s) were found to be
similar, to those described for a reactor power module.
However, no liquid metal hazards exist. Other notable
differences are due to the thermal hazard presented and
the potential worth and reusable characteristics of the
isotope, placing added emphasis on recovery.
The contingencies addressed in the study include:
• Loss of heat source cooling on the launch pad
• Launch pad explosion and fire
• Failure of cargo bay doors to open on ascent
• Retrieval and recovery of a damaged heat
source
• Recovery versus disposal options
The following provisions are considered key to the
implementation of contingency plans:
• Propellant vapor not permitted to enter cargo
bay
• Redundant heat source cooling systems avail-
able on the launch pad and in flight
Extensive blast and fragmentation shielding
Launch configuration permits an unobstruct-
ed blast ejection path to carry heat source
out of the fireball perimeter
Ejection of the heat source into an ocean area
(preferably where recovery is probable)
Clean, smooth, obstruction free cargo bay in-
terior surfaces to enhance decontamination
Sealed crew compartment to prevent radio-
active vapor from entering
Recovery aids
*
•
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NUCLEAR SAFETY IN TRANSPORT OF SMALL ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCES
PACKAGING AND INTEGRATION
The Space Shuttle may be employed to transport small
radioisotope devices (<2500 w thermal) to and from
earth orbit. The characteristics of the various isotope
devices which could be used on a Space Base can vary
considerably. Two typical isotopes considered in the
study are the Multi-Hundred Watt Radioisotope Thermo-
electric Generator (MHW), and the Radioisotope for
Thermal Energy (RITE) heat source for the Integrated
Waste Management System. The MHW's application
in conjunction with the Space Shuttle would typically
be to power subsatellites or unmanned deep space
probes that are carried into earth orbit in the cargo
bay of the Shuttle. The RITE source may be trans-
ported within a logistics pallet.
Characteristics of these two small isotopes as com-
pared with an IRV are shown in Figure 15. The fuel ;
loading of the MHW is considerably less than the IRV,
although the radiation levels are not as markedly dif-
ferent. This is due to the use of a Plutonium isotope
in the IRV which is depleted in 0. _, 0, and Pu-236,17 lo
considered an important safety feature for manned ap-
plications where considerable quantities of isotope are
required .
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Figure 15. Isotope Heat Soucre Comparison
The interfaces to be considered for small isotopes are
essentially the same as those for the IRV, however, the
approach to satisfying the interface requirements may
be different. Blast, fragmentation, fireball, and re-
entry protection must be provided for single and mul-
tiple heat source configurations. In some instances,
the heat source may not require additional cooling,
the emphasis placed on the maintenance of allowable
temperatures of the spacecraft components or equip-
ment in the logistics pallet.
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TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS
The Shuttle provides the prime mode of delivery and
retrieval of small isotopes, although, some small
isotopes may be initially launched on-board Space Base
Modules., It is expected that during a Space Base mis-
sion and at the end of mission "close out", isotope
heat sources and other non-expendable cargo would be
transferred to the Shuttle and returned to earth.
This transfer technique involving the use of a logistics
pallet is shown in Figure 16. The isotope heat
source(s) may only be a part of the total equipment in
the logistics pallet. Radiological safely requirements,
(crew dose limit, and equipment limits) are dependent
LOGISTICS PALLET
ISOTOPE HEAT
SOURCE
Figure 16. Rite Heat Source in Logistics Pallet
on the type of and quantity of isotope used and the loca-
tion with respect to the crew and equipment.
The Shuttle could be used to place an RTG and Space-
craft or Space Base subsatellite into earth orbit. This
transportation mission is illustrated in Figure 17.
CENTAUR UPPER STAGE
MHW-RTGIS
GRAND TOUR
SPACECRAFT
Figure 17. MHW on Grand Tour Spacecraft
The Shuttle is shown, placing a MHW-RTG powered
Grand Tour Spacecraft and a Centaur booster stage
into earth orbit prior to insertion of the payload into
a deep space trajectory. Additional crew shielding
may be required with this configuration.
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TERRESTRIAL NUCLEAR SAFETY
A preliminary terrestrial safety analysis (safety of the
earth's general populace and ecology) was performed
for Space Shuttle missions involving the ZrH reactor
power module and the IRV. The primary objective of
the analysis was to evaluate the extent and impact of
identified nuclear hazards on the general earth's popu-
lace. Most of the Space Shuttle launch trajectory is
over water, except for a brief land overflight of Nova
Scotia and Newfoundland. The descent trajectory for a
KSC landing is also over water, except for land over-
flight of the southernmost part of Mexico and central
Florida. Therefore hazards to the general populace
are minimized. Detailed analyses and results are
presented in Volume IV, Part 2'(72SD4201-4-2).
REACTOR TERRESTRIAL SAFETY ANALYSIS
Two approaches are used for the reactor evaluation:
(1) Dose Guideline and (2) Linear Response. In the dose
guideline approach, all individuals exposed to the dose
guideline value or above are considered exposed. This
risk approach results in the number of exposures from
an accident, but does not continue on to the biological
end-point to indicate the number of resulting injuries.
The linear response approach is based on the hypothesis
of a linear relationship between biological effect and the
amount of radiation dose which is supported by the latest
existing data on human and mammalian radiation re-
sponse. Both risk approaches provide relative data
from which priorities can be placed to enact design and
operational features to reduce overall mission risk.
The risk analysis summary for the Shuttle /Reactor pay-
load mission (Figure 18) indicates the relative exposure
indices for each phase of the mission using the linear
response and the dose guideline approach. The overall
mission risk is low. The two risk analyses approaches
result in the same relative risk ranking; the dominant
risk occurring in the Disposal Phase. The Disposal
Phase risk essentially accounts for the total mission
risk. Also indicated is the hypothetical mission risk
assuming perfectly reliable Shuttle reboosts to long-life
orbits. Analysis has shown that a Shuttle orbiter re-
covery and return to land would reduce the risk signifi-
cantly (approximately one order of magnitude). Perma-
nent reactor shutdown prior to disposal orbit insertion
and prevention of reactor excursions would also contri-
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Figure 18. Reactor Accident Evaluation &
Relative Risk Summary
bute to reducing the risk. There would essentially be
zero risk associated with the Launch/Ascent Phase if
reactor excursions can be prevented.
The linear response method results in an exposure index
value in the Prelaunch Phase while the dose guideline
method does not. The linear response model considers
exposures to zero dose levels and therefore results in
an exposure index value based on some probability of
injury event at low radiation levels. The linear response
method may also be used to indicate the degree of injury.
By selection of the proper radiation exposure threshold,
the number of acute exposures in which clinical symp-
toms of the radiation exposure are evident, can be de-
termined.
ISOTOPE TERRESTRIAL SAFETY ANALYSIS
For the isotope-Brayton risk evaluation, only the dose
guideline approach is utilized because data on the re-
sponse from deposited plutonium in the lung as a function
of radiation level is not available. Therefore, dose
guideline values for the plutonium affected organs (lung,
bone and whole body) are used in the evaluation.
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The aging effect on the isotope reentry vehicle (IRV),
fuel capsules, and the plutonium fuel after ten years of
use on the Space Base is considered to have a significant
impact on safety. Recent data appears to indicate that
aging effects may not be as pronounced as previously
assumed and a reduction of the fuel release source terms
may result. The assumed degradation due to aging would
reduce the IRV and fuel capsule survival capability. This
factor accounts for the higher failure probabilities for
atmospheric reentry accident environments.
The risk analysis summary (Figure 19) for the Space
Shuttle/isotope-Brayton nuclear payload mission shows
that the IRV Recovery (i. e., descent and reentry) Phase
accounts for practically the entire mission risk (assum-
ing aged fuel). Figure 19 indicates that up to a three
order of magnitude reduction in mission risk may be
achieved assuming no adverse aging effects on the ref-
erence isotope system. Particular emphasis on safe-
guards, in particular aging, is therefore required in the
final mission phases to improve mission safety.
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Figure 19. IRV Accident Evaluation & Relative
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A number of guidelines have resulted from the study
and are delineated in Volume V Part 2 72SD42 01-5-2.
Reference shall be made to this document and sup-
porting data in the implementation of Shuttle related
nuclear safety guidelines in future Manned Space
Flight programs. Guidelines are summarized in ac-
cordance with the following hazard reduction sequence:
• Design Features, Table 3
• Safety Devices, Table 4
• Warning Devices, Table 5
• Special Procedures, Table 6
Table 3. Design Features
• Provide multiple and Independent radiation monitoring equipment In the Shuttle.
• Provide multiple and Independent system monitoring and control equipment In the Shuttle.
• Provide a clean, smooth surface cargo bay Interior.
• Consider uncooperative "tumbling" payload retrieval with Shuttle.
• Provide maximum Shuttle contingency stay times In orbit of at least 20 days.
• Provide maximum separation distance between Shuttle crew and nuclear payload.
• Provide for free, unobstructed ejection path at the launch pad.
• Consider use of a "transfer module" to Improve safety In handling.
• Provide for Intact reentry and Impact of nuclear hardware (consider use of crush-up
material In Shuttle).
• Provide for double containment of liquid metal systems (possible use of Inert-gas
pressure liner)
• Provide blast overpressure and fragmentation protection.
• Provide Shuttle fireball protection for nuclear payloads
• Provide tracking devices on nuclear payloads
• Consider retrieval/recovery of reactor and shield only.
• Provide Isotope thermal control (cooling) capability throughout all phases of the
Shuttle mission.
• Provide Isotope heat source cooling to 420°K during prelaunch.
NUCLEAR SAFETY GUIDELINES SUMMARY
Table 4. Safety Devices
• Provide compatible liquid metal fire protection and fighting capability In the Shuttle
and at launch and landing sites.
• Provide capability to defuel the Shuttle In nuclear emergencies on the launch pad.
• Provide dry N purging capability of the Shuttle cargo bay volume on the launch pad.
• Consider use of a back-up Shuttle to support repair of a failed Shuttle or transfer or
retrieval of the payload In orbit for the continuance of the mission.
• Provide Shuttle radiation and liquid metal decontamination capability at the launch
and landing sites.
» Provide tracking and location aids for rapid land and water recovery.
• Provide for positive and permanent reactor shutdown prior to Shuttle retrieval and
recovery.
Table 5. Warning Devices
• ProTtde rapid response fire detection and alarm systems for liquid metal fires on
the Shuttle.
• Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of payload and Shuttle
failures and hazardous conditions during transport.
• Provide crew/personnel doslmetry and radiation instrumentation In Shuttle cargo bay
and crew.
• Provide means for warning of Imminent collisions with orbiting vehicles.
• Provide proper governmental authorities with technical data for advanced warnings
and preparations of impending ground Impact of Shuttle with nuclear payload.
Table 6. Special Procedures
• Provide training and procedures In the use of radiation monitoring equipment.
• Maintain administratively controlled areas with a minimum radius of approximately
13 km and exclusion areas of 4 km radius from launch site.
• Provide Installation, retrieval and maintenance procedures that do not require
breaking or opening of Nak loops.
• Establish emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) for emergency
situations.
• Prohibit launch during unsatisfactory weather conditions, particularly with winds
blowing towards populated areas.
• Minimize overflight of land and continental shelf areas.
• Provide nuclear cargo transfer operations that do not involve EVA.
• Provide direct visual or TV coverage of transfer operations.
• Minimize the crew and support personnel dose rate.
• Provide rendezvous and docking/transfer operations that make maximum use of
"spent" reactor shadow shielding.
• Allow at least 10 days after reactor shutdown before enacting Shuttle retrieval/
replacement operations.
• Provide minimum 100 year orbital lifetime for spent reactor In high earth disposal
orbit.
• Provide procedures for ejection of the payload over deep ocean or continental
shelf areas.
• Install Isotope heat sources at last practicable point In Shuttle launch countdown
sequence.
• Consider touchdown area remote from Inhabited facilities.
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TECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS
A review of the analyses and results of the study was
made to identify technical areas where significant ad-
ditional research and development are required.
Several of the key areas of technology are briefly dis-
cussed below.
BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION
The Shuttle blast and fragmentation environment in the
vicinity of the cargo bay is severe. Blast and frag-
mentation data should be obtained and concepts evalu-
ated and tested to provide the necessary protection
required of isotope and reactor payloads.
ISOTOPE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
Thermal control requirements of isotope heat sources
within the Shuttle cargo bay necessitate the design and
development of failproof/redundant systems that will
provide adequate cooling throughout the Shuttle mission.
PAYLOAD INERT GAS PROTECTIVE LINER
Liquid metal and radiological hazards resulting from
payload damage can be reduced by use of a protective
liner which can envelope the payload within the cargo
bay. The payload would remain within the liner upon
Shuttle landing and removal from the cargo bay. Con-
ceptual design and feasibility studies are required.
PAYLOAD TRANSFER MODULE
The use of a transfer module appears to offer several
advantages including improved nuclear safety in han-
dling and reduction of the design impact on the Shuttle
and nuclear payload. Support requirement trade-offs
and design studies should be performed.
PAYLOAD EJECTION
Results of the preliminary analysis indicate that con-
sideration should be given to payload ejection into con-
tinental shelf or deep ocean areas pending certain
emergency situations during ascent and descent. A
risk/benefit study should be made and concepts formu-
lated which provide minimum impact on the Shuttle.
29
The use of the transfer module to support the ejection
requirement should be considered.
GRAPPLING OF UNCOOPERATIVE NUCLEAR MODULES
Conditions can arise whereby a nuclear module could be-
come free from the Shuttle or Base while in orbit. Ran-
dom reentry should not be permitted - therefore con-
trolled retrieval and recovery by the Shuttle may be
required. Techniques should be formulated for the grap-
pling of tumbling nuclear modules, transfer to the Shuttle
cargo bay and return to earth.
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